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STRUCTURAL BREAKS, DEMAND FOR MONEY 
AND MONETARY POLICY IN NIGERIA**
The paper estimates an endogenous structural break date of the mo-
ney demand for Nigeria for the period 1960-2008. Using the Gregory and 
Hansen procedure, an endogenous break date of 1994 was estimated for the 
cointegrating equation of the demand for money. The study also joins pre-
vious ones to affi rm a stable money demand function for Nigeria.  In addi-
tion, it was established that the Central Bank of Nigeria has effectively used 
money supply as an instrument of monetary policy. 
Keywords: Demand for money, structural breaks, monetary policy, 
cointegration, Nigeria
1. Introduction
The empirical estimation of money demand stability has received growing 
attention during the past decades in many countries. This is particularly important 
for emerging economies that switched from use of direct monetary instruments 
such as credit ceilings, selective controls, administered interest and exchange 
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rates, as well as prescription of cash reserve requirements and special deposits. The 
use of market based instruments was not feasible initially because of the perceived 
underdeveloped nature of their fi nancial markets and the deliberate restraint on in-
terest rates. Since the 1980s however, following the deregulation policies in most 
developing economies, many of central banks in these countries switched to the 
use of bank rate as the major instrument of monetary policy.   Unexpectedly, some 
industrial economies in the late 1980s equally switched to bank rate as their main 
instrument of monetary policy, claiming that the liberalization of their fi nancial 
markets was responsible for the unstable nature of the demand for money in their 
economies (Rao and Kumar, 2007). If the choice of bank rate as an instrument of 
monetary policy may result to stable money demand as against fi nancial markets 
liberalization perceived by industrial economies before the recent fi nancial melt-
down, then it would be proper to test the stability of money demand in the develop-
ing economies since the policy shift. This can be done by applying methods in time 
series techniques like test for cointegration in models with regime and trend shifts. 
Series of studies have applied these recent time series techniques in sub-Sa-
haran Africa on varied topics. Few studies however, based on cointegration tech-
nique have been reported to have tested the stability of money demand function in 
Nigeria particularly since the 1986 structural policy shift (see for instance, Akinlo, 
2006; Teriba, 2006 a,b; Owoye and Onofowora, 2007; Omotor, 2009; Chukwu, 
Agu and Onah, 2010 among others). These studies from a policy perspective, did 
not examine the implication of the estimates of the demand for money to under-
standing whether the Central Bank of Nigeria has successfully used monetary 
policy to achieve its objectives.
The second objective of this paper is to fi ll this gap in the empirical literature 
on the stability of the demand for money in Nigeria by allowing for structural 
breaks in the cointegrating relationship following the lead of Gregory and Hansen 
(1996a) as amplifi ed by Rao and Kumar (2007).  The Gregory and Hansen tech-
nique test is used to estimate cointegrating equations by endogenously determin-
ing the single break date, as against the Juselius (1996) test which assumes the sin-
gle break date is known a priori. Although in recent times there exist complemen-
tary techniques in simultaneously determining two or more breaks, endogenous 
determination of a single break date using Nigerian data is mute in the empirical 
literature. It is thus reasonable to determine such a single break date endogenously 
(very reliable for measuring policy effectiveness) from the time series as it may be 
different from that which is exogenously fi xed a priori.  
The structure of the paper following the introduction is as follows: section 
2 highlights some empirical literature on the study of money demand. Nigeria’s 
monetary policy episodes are discussed in section 3 while section 4 presents the 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) cointegration approach with structural breaks as re-
layed by Rao and Kumar (2007). The empirical estimates of the break date and 
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their implications in determining the success of monetary policy in Nigeria are 
examined in section 5. Section 6 provides the conclusion.
2. Review of Empirical Literature
There has been a vast number of studies of money demand in sub-Saharan 
African countries; most of them on the Nigerian economy. Table 1 summarizes 
the estimated income coeffi cients and their main fi ndings. Majority of the studies 
found the income coeffi cient to be positive with its value near unity. We briefl y 
discuss some of the studies summarized in Table 1. 
Teriba (1974) is one of the earliest studies of money demand in Nigeria and 
probably the foremost to model demand deposit. Using a double log specifi cation and 
static Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique with annual data from 1958-1972, 
the study reported a high signifi cant income-elasticity of demand deposits in Nigeria 
while interest rates were not statistically signifi cant. Arinze, Darrat and Meyer (1990) 
however found foreign interest rate to be inversely related to the demand for money.
Nwaobi (2002) and Nwafor, Nwakanma, Nkasah and Thopmson (2007) ex-
amined the stability of money demand for Nigeria using vector autoregression 
approach. Their results confi rmed a stable money demand function for Nigeria. 
Akinlo (2006) using an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) technique com-
bined with CUSUM and CUSUMQ tests, examined the cointegrating property 
and stability of broad (M2) money demand in Nigeria. The results show M2 to 
be cointegrated with income, interest rate and exchange rate. The CUSUM test 
weakly reported a stable money demand for Nigeria. Omotor (2009) also applied 
the ARDL technique and equally found a stable money demand for Nigeria.
Nachega (2001) applies a cointegrated analysis and error correction modeling 
to investigate the behavior of broad money demand in Cameroon over 1963/64 
– 1993/1994. The cointegrated VAR analysis identifi ed a stable money demand 
function and an excess aggregate demand relationship for Cameroon. Further em-
pirical estimates provided support for both purchasing power parity (PPP) and an 
international Fisher parity between Cameroon and France.
Nell (1999) empirically evaluated the existence of a stable long-run demand 
for money function over the period 1965-1997; given that after the adoption of 
money market-oriented monetary policy measures in 1980, South Africa Reserve 
Bank primarily relied on setting predetermined growth targets for M3. The em-
pirical results suggest that M3 was stable while M1 and M2 display parameter 
instability. This suggests that M3 money stock could serve as an indicator for 
monetary policy for South Africa.
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Kallon (1992) paper among other issues sought to determine whether the 
Ghanaian demand for real money balances was stable during the 1966:1 to 1986:4 
period. The results failed to reject the null hypothesis of structural stability. The 
paper also fi nds evidence of the nominal adjustment specifi cation as the appropri-
ate short-run adjustment mechanism for the demand for real M1 balances. Further 
suggestion of foreign interest rates not having any signifi cant effect on the de-
mand for money in Ghana was evidenced.
Although most of the studies presented in the Table 1 relate to establishing 
a stable money demand using various techniques and models, however, in all the 
studies there are no formal tests for structural breaks in the relationships, except 
Chukwu, Agu and Onah (2010). Chukwu, et. al (2010) study ‘claim’ to apply 
the Gregory- Hansen (1996) framework to capture endogenous structural breaks 
in Nigeria for the period 1986:1 to 2006:4. The study analyzed four equations-
level shift (change in intercept), level shift with trend, regime shift (where in-
tercept and slope coeffi cients change) and regime shift (where intercept, slope 
coeffi cients and trend change). What is obvious in their presentations is that the 
Gregory-Hansen cointegration tests were not estimated either using the ADF 
procedure or the Phillips approach; rather, what they presented were estimates 
of slope coeffi cients and structural break periods. This further provides the im-
petus to formally tests for structural breaks in the money demand relationships 
using Nigerian data. Even if they did presumably, their study did not empirically 
determine the policy effectiveness of the Central Bank of Nigeria. This paper 
also bridges that gap.
3. Evolution and Development of Monetary Policy in Nigeria1
Nigeria monetary framework is characterized by various episodes of mon-
etary policy probably due to the dissatisfaction with the ability of monetary 
policy strategy to achieve its target objectives of price stability and minimal 
infl ation (Oluba, 2008). The institution responsible for this is the Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN).
The establishment of the CBN in July 1957 paved way for the use of mon-
etary policy as instrument of economic management (Teriba, 1976) even if there 
instruments were direct.  The major task of this section is to describe the changing 
emphasis on these objectives.
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3.1. The Formative Years, July 1959 – March 1962
Prior to 1964, it has been argued, that no conscious monetary policies 
were implemented in Nigeria as operations of the CBN did not start until July 
1959.  In March 1962 following the launching of the country’s Second National 
Development Plan (1961-1964), the CBN came into limelight of development 
fi nancing.  Monetary issues of concern (since the country was using the currency 
of the West African Currency Board) were the establishment of a strong fi nancial 
base and the promotion of domestic fi nancial infrastructures such as the money 
and capital market institutions and instruments (Gbosi, 1993:266).  Notable ac-
tions taken during this period included the issuance of the Nigerian currency, in-
troduction of the fi rst Nigerian money market instrument – the Treasury Bills, 
establishment of the Nigerian Stock etc.  The most active policy instrument during 
this period was the interest rate.  For instance, between April, 1960 and December 
1960, the discount rate and treasury rate were raised 10 and 13 times respectively. 
The aim of the Treasury bill then was to encourage commercial banks to repatriate 
short-term funds from London.
3.2. The Period 1962 – 1975
 
The fi rst era of this period witnessed the Amendment Act of 1962 that 
strengthened the Central Bank for effective monetary policy promotion.  Cheap 
monetary policy was adopted during this fi rst era to enable the government borrow 
as cheaply as possible for purpose of fi nancing the Second National Development 
Plan.
During the period 1964-1966, monetary policy was targeted at defending the 
balance of payments given the rapid credit expansion experienced in this period, 
which encouraged increased demand for imports and subsequent drain on foreign 
reserves.  Monetary policy instruments used this period included fi xing the ex-
change rate, interest rate, discount rate control, variable liquid assets and moral 
suasion to reserve the credit expansion.
Owing to the civil war in 1970, the Nigerian economy experienced an in-
fl ationary spree.  Other factors that fuelled infl ation were the unrealistic wage 
increase awarded by the Adebo and Udoji Commissions in 1971 and 1974 respec-
tively.  Consequently, infl ation became the most serious problem in Nigeria.  The 
Central Bank to this effect embarked on some direct control measures in order to 
salvage the infl ationary bite.  This included encouragement of commercial banks 
to channel a greater and increasing percentage of their credit allocation to produc-
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tive sectors of the economy (Ajayi and Ojo, 1979).  Other measures were targeted 
at reducing the liquidity of commercial banks and issuance of ‘stabilization secu-
rities’.  Under this scheme, the CBN was given powers to sell or allocate these 
securities to, or repurchase from any banking institution (Gbosi, 1993).
3.3. The Period 1975-1992: Direct Control Era
 
This period has been abruptly described as the direct control era.  The major 
objective of monetary policy during this period was to promote rapid and sus-
tainable economic growth.  To this end, monetary authority imposed quantitative 
interest rate and credit ceilings on the money deposit of banks and sustained the 
sectoral credit allocation policy to ‘preferred’ sectors (agriculture, manufactur-
ing, and residential housing).  Less ‘preferred sectors’ imports and general (com-
merce) and “others”.  This classifi cation as explained by Nnanna (2001:5) enabled 
the monetary authorities to direct fi nancial resources at concessionary rates to 
sectors considered as priority areas.  These rates were typically below the CBN –
determined minimum rediscount rate (MRR), though still low and not determined 
by market forces.
The CBN also compelled banks to deposit with it (special deposit) any short-
fall in the allocation of credit to the designated preferred sectors.  However, this 
policy of direct control in the allocation of credit to the priority sectors did not 
meet the prescribed targets and failed to impact positively on investment, output 
and domestic prices.  As further observed by Nnanna (2002: 9), banks’ aggregate 
loans to the productive sector between 1972 and 1985 averaged 40.7 per cent to 
total credit, about 8.7 percentage points lower than the stipulated target of 49.4 
percent.
The period of the ‘Control Regime’ equally experienced an impaired effec-
tiveness of monetary policy. One major factor often cited was lack of instrument 
autonomy of the Central Bank as the Ministry of Finance infl uenced by short-term 
political considerations largely dictated monetary policy.  Empirical evidence as 
cited in Nnanna (2002) on the works of Fisher (1994) and Ojo (2000) support the 
goals of Central Banks’ autonomy.  Instrument autonomy of Central Banks (CBs) 
is predicated on the strong infl uence CBs have on monetary management and their 
ability to achieve monetary policy objectives.
In 1987 the monetary and credit policy measures adopted were designed to 
facilitate the achievement of the goals of the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP).  The adoption of SAP was as a result of harsh and severe economic dif-
fi culties in 1985.  The SAP programme was aimed at reforming and dismantling 
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the control regime and enhancement, promotion and use of indirect instruments 
of monetary controls.  This ushered in the current monetary policy framework.
3.4. The Period of Indirect Instrument of Monetary Control (1993-Date)
 
The era began with selective removal of credit ceilings for banks beginning 
in September, 1993 following the promulgation of the CBN Decree 24 and the 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID) 25 of 1991.  In 1998 
Decree Numbers 37 and 38 of the CBN (Amendment) and BOFID (Amendment) 
were promulgated.  In overall, the CBN Act was amended and granted it more 
discretion and autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy.
The monetary policy framework of indirect controls involved the use of mar-
ket instruments, particularly the Open Market Operations (OMO) introduced at 
end of June 1993 and is conducted wholly on Nigeria Treasury Bills (TBs), in-
cluding Repurchase Agreements (REPOS).  The OMO is complemented by the 
CBN with the use of reserve requirements are the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) 
and the Liquidity Ratio (LR).  The CRR has been progressively increased from 
6 percent in 1995 to 12.5 percent in April, 2001.  In 2005 there was an upward 
adjustment of the CRR by a total of 150 basis points and subsequent reduction.
The conduct of monetary policy during this era particularly in the early pe-
riod was very phenomenal especially when viewed from the socio-political issues 
that characterized it. First, it was observed that the fi nancial deepening index of 
M2/GDP which crashed from 35.9 in 1986 to 24.2 in 1992 increased by 29.7 in 
1994. Second, the performance of the economy deteriorated in 1994 owing to the 
disruption caused by the prolonged political crisis and macroeconomic instability, 
arising from government’s policy of guided deregulation.
The Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR) has been used by the CBN to infl u-
ence the level and direction of other interest rates.  The changes in the rate indicate 
whether the monetary authorities wish to adopt a policy of monetary tightening 
or otherwise.  The rate was 16.5 in December 2002, 15 percent in June 2004, 13 
percent in December 2005 and 10 percent in December 2006.
In recent times, the CBN has been committed to ensuring price and exchange 
rate stability through restrictive monetary policy stance.  This it has done with the 
introduction of the Wholesale Dutch Auction System (WDAS) and non-discount-
able Special Nigerian Treasury Bills (NTBs).  In 2006, the CBN also introduced a 
new interest-rate determination scheme which establishes an interest-rate spread 
of three percentage points and above and below a short-term Monetary Policy 
Rate (MPR replaced MRR and became effective 11th December, 2006). The MPR 
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fi xed at 10 percent in 2006 was reduced and retained at 8.0 percent in August 
2007. Consequently, the annual headline infl ation rate which averaged 17.9 per-
cent in 2005 stood at 8.4 percent in 2006.  Infl ation stayed within single-digit of 
6.4 percent in the fi rst half of 2007.  The exchange rate on the other hand has also 
faired well relatively.  Apart from a drop in the market premium in the fi rst week 
of 2006 June 2006 from N24 to N9.00, the naira exchange rate appreciated from 
US$1/N151 in March 2006 to US$1/ N126.88 at end-March 2007 and appreciated 
to US$1/ N126.05 at end-June, 2007 (Central Bank of Nigeria Communiqué of 
the Monetary Policy Committee: various issues). Other policies of this period in-
clude recapitalization and consolidation of banks. The period 2006-2008, referred 
to as the period of post-banking consolidation is characterized by the gradual run-
down of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) holding of treasury bills (TBs), zero 
tolerance on ways and means advances and a frequent adjustment of the MPR2. 
With policy shifting to use of MPR coupled with a deregulated money market; 
will the money demand function still be stable?
4. The Gregory-Hansen Methodology
Gregory and Hansen (1996a) made an important contribution in the exist-
ing literature on cointegration by proposing residual-based tests of the null of no 
cointegration for the listed variables with I(1) order in the presence of structural 
breaks against the alternative cointegration. The Gregory-Hansen (G-H hence-
forth) methodology is an extension of the Engle-Granger (1987) cointegration 
analysis and can be viewed as a multivariate extension of the endogenous break 
test for univariate series The test allows testing for presence of cointegration 
among the variables of interest given the variables to be difference stationary or 
integrated of order one (Singh and Pandey, 2009). G-H proposes three models 
with different assumptions about structural breaks in the cointegrating relation-
ship. These are, level shift, denoted as C; level shift with trend, denoted as C/T; 
and regime shift (both level shift and slope coeffi cients can change), this can be 
denoted as C/S (Gregory and Hansen, 1996b). The single break date in these mod-
els is assumed to be endogenously determined. Using a two-variable specifi cation, 
the three models can be stated as follows:
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 measure respectively the intercept before the break in 
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and the shift occurred after the break, β
1
 and δ are slope coeffi cients attached to 
the cointegrating vector and time trend respectively, β
2
 measures the change in the 
cointegrating vector after the regime shift,  
t
 is a time subscript, ε is an error term, 
k is the break date, and D
tk
 is a dummy variable defi ned as 
                                                                                       (4)
with k denoting the point at which the break occurs. These models can easily be 
extended to more than one explanatory variable. As further explained by Cook 
(2006:1381), the residuals obtained from the above cointegrating regressions are 
then employed in the Dickey- Fuller test to provide a modifi ed Engle-Granger 
(1987) test which allows for structural change in the cointegrating relationship:
           
(5)
where ∆ denotes the difference operator such that  Δε t − ε t−1 . When determining 
the point at which to impose a break, Cook (2006: 1318) noted Gregory and Hansen 
(1996) suggestion of the use of a grid search procedure, with values in the central 
70% of the sample being considered for k. That for each of the models (Equations 
1-3), the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test of Equation 5 is estimated, with value employed as 
a resulting test statistic being the minimum value obtained for t-ratio of r̂.
For purpose of clarity, the potential confusion and difference between 
structural breaks and non-stationarity in the data is here reiterated. According to 
Adachi and Liu (2009), the Perron (1997) procedure which allows for a breaking 
trend in the conventional augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test should 
not be misunderstood with structural break with a lack of cointegration. Rather, 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) structural breaks technique is an extension of Engle 
and Granger’s (1987) cointegration procedure which allows for a shift of param-
eters in the cointegration equation. In addition, the unit roots and cointegration 
with structural breaks are not only different conceptually, they have different criti-
cal values. Rao and Kumar (2007) have further observed that with regime shifts, 
the distribution theory used to evaluate the residual-based tests is different from 
the standard MacKinnon (1991) cointegration tests used in the Engle and Granger 
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 Δε t = pêt−1 + μt
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D. G. OMOTOR: Structural Breaks, Demand for Money and Monetary Policy in Nigeria
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 62 (9-10) 559-582 (2011)570
modifi ed MacKinnon (1991) critical values for testing cointegration in the Engle 
and Granger method with unknown breaks. This is the methodology we follow in 
this study.
In the literature, the general specifi cation of the long-run money demand 
takes the functional relationship for most emerging economies in the form:
         (6)
where M/P, the demand for real balances is a function of the chosen scale variable 
(Y) to represent economic activity and the opportunity cost of holding money (r). 
M is the selected monetary aggregate in nominal term and P, the price level. As 
further stated in Akinlo (2006), there is a general consensus in the literature that 
the money demand function be estimated in log-linear form. Letting the monetary 
aggregates and the scale variables be in logarithms; the interest rates in levels4, the 
demand for money in Nigeria can be specifi ed as:
        (7)
where M2 is broad money, Y is real GDP, its coeffi cient is expected to have posi-
tive sign, and r is the nominal interest rate (MPR), whose coeffi cient is expected 
to be negative. Although several studies on developing economies have used the 
narrow money measurement to refl ect the underdeveloped nature of their fi nancial 
markets, other studies on the demand for money in Nigeria have employed the 
broad money defi nition with satisfying results. The use of M2 also fi nd favour in 
the argument of Hafer and Jansen (1991) and Laidler (1993) that the boundaries of 
narrow money demand shift over time to accommodate new fi nancial instruments, 
thus making it plausible to apply M2 in money demand analyses. The implied 
specifi cations for the three G-H Equations (1-3) with structural breaks are stated 
as follow:
   (8)
          
 (9)
   (10)
The estimable equations for which cointegration is tested for are (8), (9) and 




= Y ,r( )
 lnM2t = γ +φ lnYt +ψ rt + ε t
 ln Mt =α1 +α2 Dtk + β1 lnYt +ψ 1rt + ε t
 ln Mt =α1 +α2 Dtk +δ t + β1 lnYt +ψ 1rt + ε t
 ln Mt =α1 +α2 Dtk + β1 lnYt + β2 lnYt Dtk +ψ 1rt +ψ 2rt Dtk + ε t
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5. Empirical Results of the Break Date and Dynamic Specifi cation
The paper uses annual data from 1960 to 2008. The source of data is the 
Central Bank of Nigeria: Statistical Bulletin, 50 years Special Anniversary Edition. 
5.1. Results of Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
It is important to check for the unit root properties of the individual series 
being time series in nature in order to avoid the problem of spurious regression. 
We examined the order of integration of the individual series using the Dickey-
Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests of unit root with their re-
sults reported in Table 2. The DF and ADF tests indicate presence of unit root at 
level but all the series are stationary at fi rst difference. It should be noted that we 
used constant and trend at levels but only constant at difference series since it is 
believed that differencing of the series takes away trend from the series (Singh and 
Pandey, 2009). The individual series of output, money supply, nominal interest 
rate and infl ation rate used in the analysis are also respectively displayed graphi-
cally in Appendix A.
Table 2. 
UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS
Variables
Dickey-Fuller (DF) critical values Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) critical values
Level First difference Level First difference
M 1.835 -4.254* 1.202 -3.545*
Y -1.183 -6.164* -1.172 -4.964*
r -1.947 -8.932* -1.506 -7.761*
*Indicate signifi cance at 1% level of signifi cance
Next we proceed to the estimate Equations 8-10 from 1960 to 2008. The re-
sults are presented in Table 3. The results of the estimations suggest that G-H2 is 
the most plausible model since its null is rejected at 1 per cent level; while G-H1 
and G-H3 failed the tests as their null fall into the acceptance region, thus rejected 
as implausible. The endogenously determined break date of G-H2 is 1994. In this 
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model all estimated coeffi cients are signifi cant at 1 per cent except the 1994 time 
trend which is weakly signifi cant at about 11 per cent. The income elasticity coeffi -
cient of 0.51 though very low, is positively signed as expected a priori. Consequent 
upon this, we use the made residuals from G-H2 to estimate the short-run dynamic 
equation for the money demand with the error correction term in the spirit of Engle 
and Granger (1987). As earlier observed, the decade of the 1990 especially before 
mid-1990, can be described as a period of policy reversers and lost opportunities. 
First, the package of economic reforms embarked upon from the mid-1980s had its 
backlash effects on the real economy which were equally transmitted to the fi nancial 
system. The experimentation with deregulation and liberalization was truncated in 
1994 following the prolonged political crisis that chronicled into a palace coup led 
by the late Gen. Sanni Abacha. Second, the administration in a policy summersault 
re-regulated the economy, by capping exchange and interest rates in the spirit of 
guided deregulation. Thus in 1994, the GDP grew by 1.3 per cent while the infl a-
tion rate reached an all time highest of 57 per cent. Table 4 further present’s average 
growth rates of some monetary indicators.
Table 3. 















G-H1 1981 -3.899 -5.16 -4.92 -4.69 no
G-H2 1994 -5.551* -5.51 -5.29 -5.03 yes
G-H3 1992 -4.625 -5.73 -5.73 -5.23 no
Source: Author’s calculations. Asymptotic critical values obtained from Gregory and Hansen 
(1996:109).
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Intercept 5.03 (19.60) 5.26* (9.60) 5.06 (19.31)
Trend 0.01 (0.47)
ln Y
t 0.53 (13.15) 0.51* (6.99) 0.52 (12.24)
r
t -0.89 (6.43) -0.92* (6.14) -0.85 (5.78)
Dummy 1981 0.29 (2.30)





Dummy 1994 0.23 (1.65)**
Notes: Absolute t-ratios are reported in parentheses. An asterisk points to signifi cance at 1 per cent 
level of signifi cance and indicated for only G-H2 being the Equation of interest.                                      
Source: Author’s calculations.
5.2.  Basic Estimates of the Error-Correction Model of Real M2 Money 
Demand 
The next stage is application of the general-to-specifi c modeling framework 
to develop the short term ECM model. To obtain model of the error correction 
mechanism, we regressed differenced series of money demand (M) on its own 
lags, the differenced terms of real GDP, interest rate, and their lagged terms, and 
the one-period lagged residuals from the cointegrating vector of Gregory and 
Hansen (G-H2). This over- parameterized model had lags up to four periods ex-
cept for the ECM. By applying the LSE Hendry methodology, the numbers of the 
right-hand side variables were reduced until we obtained the most parsimonious 
model reported in Table 5. The absolute t-ratios are in parentheses and * and ** 
indicate signifi cance at the 5% and 10 % respectively. All estimated coeffi cients 
are signifi cant at the conventional levels of 5% and 10% except the interest rate 
coeffi cient, though rightly signed, it is statistically not signifi cant. The poor be-
haviour of the interest rate in the estimated model may be a reason why the CBN 
relies more on open market operations (OMO) in the manipulation of monetary 
policy. The one period lagged error correction term (ECM
t-1
) has the expected sign 
implying negative feedback mechanism and statistically signifi cant at 5 per cent. 
The relative small size of the coeffi cient (-0.233) signifi es smooth adjustment to-
wards equilibrium. Thus if there are departure from equilibrium in the period, the 
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departure is reduced by about 23 per cent.  From the battery of tests, the residuals 
are neither autocorrelated nor heteroscedastic. 
Table 5. 
PARSIMONIOUS RESULTS WITH DEPENDENT VARIABLE = ∆LN M
t
Explanatory Variable Coeffi cients (absolute t-ratio) Test Statistic
∆ln M
t-1
0.483* (3.311) R-2 = 0.123
∆ln Y
t










 = 1.08 (0.14)
Source: Author’s calculations.
5.3. Test for Structural Stability
In order to test the stability of the function, we applied both the CUSUM and 
CUSUM of squares tests (Brown, Durbin, and Evans, 1975). The CUSUM test is 
based on the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals which plots the cumulative 
sum together with the 5 per cent critical lines. The test fi nds parameter instability 
if the cumulative sum goes outside the area between the two critical lines. The 
CUSUM of squares test is like the CUSUM test, with movement outside the criti-
cal lines suggestive of parameter or variance instability. Both plots are shown in 
Figures 1 and 2 respectively. Both plots did not report any sign of instability; thus 
implying that the demand for money is temporarily stable in Nigeria. According 
to Poole (1970) as cited in Rao and Kumar (2009), it can be inferred from by these 
results that money supply is the appropriate monetary policy instrument of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria.
5.4. Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
 
The structural stability test indicate a stable demand for money in Nigeria but 
there was a regime shift in 1994, which caused a sharp increase in the demand for 
money of about 39.54 per cent. The implication is that the average stock of real 
money was 39.54 per cent higher during 1994-2007 than in earlier period5. 
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Did the Central Bank of Nigeria use monetary policy effectively to achieve 
its objectives, particularly price stability? To answer this question, we followed 
Rao Kumar (2007) lead by computing the real excess supply of money (EXCMS) 
using the point estimate of 0.506 (see Table 4) as the income elasticity of demand 
for money. 
The computation of the excess money supply values are presented in Table 
6. The entire period (1960-2008) was broken down into four sub-periods judging 
with infl ationary trend behavior of the economy. In the entire period of analysis 
(1960-2008), EXCMS is small and positive. We can deduce that the CBN may 
have maintained monetary equilibrium in the money market although average 
infl ationary rate was high. The period 1973-1995, Nigeria experienced an unprec-
edented threshold infl ation rate (27.24 per cent) and this followed with a relatively 
moderate infl ation (11.95 per cent). During the high infl ation period, EXCMS was 
negative (-0.723 per cent) implying the CBN’s policy assisted in dampening the 
high infl ation expectation occasioned by the oil price shocks of the 1970s and high 
budget defi cits primarily fi nanced by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The 
success of the restrictive monetary policy of the CBN is seen in the reduction in 
the infl ationary rate in the period 1996-2008. This is not to say that the increased 
excess money supply did not have some infl ationary impact. It did from the price 
change.
The monetary expansion also resulted in output falling from its 1973-1995 
level of 1.8 percent to 0.52 per cent in 1996-1998. However, the fall in output as 
a result of the excess money supply of 1996-2008 is less than the proportionate 





EXCMS ∆ ln y ∆ ln p
1961 – 2008 0.156 1.179 17.216
1961 – 1972 0.655 0.703 4.928
1973 – 1995 -0.723 1.800 27.244
1996 – 2008 1.253 0.520 11.955
Source: Author’s calculations
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6. Concluding Remarks
 
This study addresses three basic questions on the money demand function of 
Nigeria for the period 1960-2008. What is the endogenously determined structural 
break date in the cointegrating equation of the money demand function of Ni-
geria? Is the Nigerian money demand function stable over the period 1960-2008? 
And fi nally, did the Central Bank of Nigeria use monetary policy effectively to 
achieve its objectives during the period of analysis? To address the fi rst question 
comprehensively, Table 4 presents the fi ndings using the Gregory and Hansen pro-
cedures to test for an endogenously structural break date. The endogenously break 
date is 1994. This year is characterized by various policy shifts and a reversal 
among them is the truncation of the liberalisation and deregulation policy by the 
then new government led by the late Gen. Sanni Abacha.
The second question- stability of the demand for money in Nigeria.  The 
plots of Figures 1 and 2 did not report any sign of instability. This implies that the 
demand for money is at least temporarily stable in Nigeria. Thus, money supply 
is an appropriate monetary policy instrument of the Central Bank of Nigeria. This 
also adds support to similar studies that have affi rmed this.
Finally, did the Central Bank of Nigeria achieve the objective for which 
monetary policy was formulated? We used three sub-periods to examine the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy in Nigeria. During the period of high infl ation, 
1973-1995, monetary policy was highly restrictive and helped to reduce infl a-
tion rate by dampening infl ationary expectations. To answer in the affi rmative, 
the CBN uses money supply as a monetary policy instrument effectively. Table 
6 reports the details of the estimations. It should however be noted that the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy can only be sustained by strong and transparent 
institutions among them the monetary authorities which is expected to be policy 
and instrument independent. 
Endnotes
1. This section is extracted from an earlier paper by Omotor (2010), processed.
2. See various decisions of the CBN, Monetary Policy Committee Meeting. 
http://www.cenbank.org/monetary policy/decisions.asp [03/05/2010].
3. As noted in Singh and Pandey (2009), constant and trend were used at level 
but only constant at difference series while testing the null of a unit root with 
PP test, because differencing the series takes away trend from the series.
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4. Some models have used the logarithm of interest rate.
5. Computed from raw data on money supply.
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STRUKTURNI PREKIDI, POTRAŽNJA ZA NOVCEM 
I MONETARNA POLITIKA U NIGERIJI
Sažetak
U ovom se radu procjenjuje datum endogenog strukturnog prekida u funkciji po-
tražnje za novcem u Nigeriji za razdoblje 1960.-2008. Koristeći se Gregory-Hansen me-
todom, za kointegracijsku jednadžbu potražnje za novcem određeno je da se endogeni 
prekid dogodio u 1994. Studija se nadovezuje na prethodne radove i potvrđuje stabilnost 
funkcije potražnje za novcem u Nigeriji. Povrh toga ustanovljeno je da je Središnja nige-
rijska banka uspješno upotrebljavala ponudu novca kao instrument monetarne politike. 
Ključne riječi: potražnja za novcem, strukturni prekidi, monetarna politika, Nigerija
